cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction

cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction

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时间:2018-02-10

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1、GamesandEconomicBehavior66(2009)785812www.elsevier.com/locate/gebCooperativebehaviorandthefrequencyofsocialinteractionJohnDuffy∗,JackOchsDepartmentofEconomics,UniversityofPittsburgh,Pittsburgh,PA15260,USAReceived30June2006Availableonline9August2008AbstractWereportresu

2、ltsfromanexperimentthatexaminesplayinanindefinitelyrepeated,two-playerPrisonersDilemmagame.EachexperimentalsessioninvolvesNsubjectsandasequenceofindefinitelyrepeatedgames.Themaintreatmentconsistsofwhetheragentsarematchedinfixedpairingsormatchedrandomlyineachindefinitelyre

3、peatedgame.Withintherandommatchingtreatment,weelicitplayersstrategiesandbeliefsorvarytheinformationthatplayershaveabouttheiropponents.ContrarytoatheoreticalpossibilitysuggestedbyKandori[1992.Socialnormsandcommunityenforcement.Rev.Econ.Stud.59,6380],acooperativenormdoe

4、snotemergeinthetreatmentswhereplayersarematchedrandomly.Ontheotherhand,inthefixedpairingstreatment,theevidencesuggeststhatacooperativenormdoesemergeasplayersgainmoreexperience.©2008ElsevierInc.Allrightsreserved.JELclassification:C72;C73;C78;C92;D83Keywords:Cooperation;M

5、atching;RepeatedPrisonersDilemma;Folktheorem;Communityenforcement;Socialnorms;ExperimentaldesignSometimescooperationemergeswhereitisleastexpected.RobertAxelrod,TheEvolutionofCooperation(1984,p.73).1.IntroductionCooperativebehaviorcanexposeindividualstopossibleexploita

6、tionbyotherswhoarewillingtoactoppor-tunistically.Nevertheless,cooperationcanbesustainedifopportunisticbehaviortriggersapunishmentthatmakescheatingunattractive.Muchcooperativebehaviorissustainedbydecentralized,informalenforcementmechanisms.Thesemechanismsrelyonindividu

7、alshavinganinterestinhowtheircurrentactionsaffectfuturesocialinteractions.AsKandori(1992)notes,therearetwogeneralclassesofinformalmechanisms:Personalenforcement,whereop-portunisticbehaviortodaydestroysthepossiblebenefitsoffuturecooperationbetweentheindividualwhohasbeen

8、cheatedandthecheater;Communityenforcement,whereacheaterissanctionedbyothermembersofthecommunitywhohavenotthemselvesbeenvicti

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